The main interest rests in the exploration of different perspectives on complementarity of legal liability and autonomy. Legal philosopher Joel Feinberg in his third volume of his treatise Harm to Self (1986) differentiated four meanings of autonomy: as a condition, a right, an ideal and a capacity. What kind of shifts can be observed in contemporary interpretation of autonomy as self-determination? Which questions and issues arise for the understanding of legal liability, if the perspective on autonomy of human being is changing?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Guarantors of the section:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n prof. JUDr. Mgr. Martina Gajdo\u0161ov\u00e1, PhD.<\/p>\n\n\n\n prof. Mgr. \u013dubom\u00edr Batka, Dr. theol.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Pr\u00e1vna zodpovednos\u0165 a auton\u00f3mia Hlavn\u00fdm predmetom z\u00e1ujmu je sk\u00fama\u0165 r\u00f4zne poh\u013eady na komplementaritu pr\u00e1vnej zodpovednosti a auton\u00f3mie. Pr\u00e1vny filozof Joel Feinberg v tre\u0165om zv\u00e4zku svojho diela Harm to Self (1986) diferencoval \u0161tyri v\u00fdznamy auton\u00f3mie: ako stav (condition), pr\u00e1vo (right), ide\u00e1l (ideal) a schopnos\u0165 (capacity). Ak\u00e9 posuny mo\u017eno bada\u0165 v s\u00fa\u010dasnej interpret\u00e1cii auton\u00f3mie ako sebaur\u010denia? Ktor\u00e9 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-399","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"yoast_head":"\n